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Embryos have different meanings for different people and in different contexts. Seen under the micro-
scope, the biological embryo starts out as one cell and then becomes a bunch of cells. Gradually these
divide and differentiate to make up the embryo, which in humans becomes a fetus at eight weeks, and
then eventually a baby. At least, that happens in those cases that carry through normally and successfully.
Yet a popular public perception imagines the embryo as already a little person in the very earliest stages
of development, as if it were predictably to become an adult. In actuality, cells can combine, pull apart,
and recombine in a variety of ways and still produce embryos, whereas most embryos never develop into
adults at all. Biological embryos and popular imaginations of embryos diverge. This paper looks at some
of the historical reasons for and social implications of that divergence.
 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesThis essay takes embryos as its subject, and human embryos in
particular. An assumption in understanding human embryos holds
that they are very much like embryos in closely related organisms,
and that we can therefore learn about humans by studying other
animal embryos. The “media” to be explored, therefore, includes
the embryos of humans and other animals, and also interpretations
of those embryos. The “instruments” include imagination, obser-
vation, and experimentation, with quite different results in each
case. In fact, study of embryos as they appear in society reveals
distinct understandings that reﬂect underlying divergent in-
terpretations of life.
Although there are various versions within each of these un-
derstandings, discussion here will look at one cluster of ideas
representing the public embryo, and at a different cluster of ideas
representing biological embryos. These two ideas about embryos
are not the same, nor are they even obviously converging, so it is
worth examining the reasons for the differences and relationships
while being clear about each understanding in itself. These ideas
receive much more extensive presentation in a larger context withmpe, AZ 85287-4501, United
td. This is an open access article ua different focus in my Embryos Under The Microscope: Diverging
Meanings of Life published with Harvard University Press, 2014. I
beneﬁtted from discussions of the ideas at York University in the
seminar series organized by Joan Steigerwald, which forms the
basis of this set of essays. She urged participants to write these as
essays, pointing liberally to other published works of our own,
which I have done. More detail and additional references reside in
those longer works, as well as in those of others whose contribu-
tions are only mentioned here.1. Public embryos
By public embryos, I mean those that exist in the public and
political arenas. Of course there are public leaders who embrace
biological understandings as well, but the publicly imagined em-
bryo is the one most often invoked in public and policy discussions.
This embryo seems familiar. It starts as an egg cell that undergoes
“conception” as it is fertilized and becomes the very ﬁrst stages of
an individual’s life. This is largely an imagined rather than an
observed embryo. Then the embryo becomes implanted into a
woman’s uterus and begins to grow and undergo differentiation,
and at this point it becomes even more an imagined entity since itnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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continuous process that deﬁnes the life of an individual human.
Indeed, this description is biologically accurate as welldto a
point and at a general level. We’ll get to the differences in the next
section. At this point, this public understanding of the embryo is
not directly in opposition to our scientiﬁc knowledge. But it adds a
great deal of imagination to the biological facts we know. And it is
those imagined properties that matter in public discussions; we
imagine that the embryo is alive, a “life” that is essentially the same
at all developmental stages. In this case, we might be tempted to
invoke claims about the meaning at all developmental stages of the
embryo that go beyond what we can see and what we can know.
We might, for example, invoke something like the “personhood”
movement does. Supporters of this movement argue that the em-
bryo starting at fertilization has personhood and deserves the same
rights and protections of any other person (For example, see the
websites for personhoodusa.com, personhood.net, and those of
other related organizations with similar names.). The Catholic
Church and many others share the assumption that with fertiliza-
tion, or conception, comes personhood.
This is not the place for a philosophical or political discussion
about personhood, though there are certainly many things to say
about that subject. It is, however, the place to acknowledge that this
publicly imagined embryo-as-little-person exists in the public
arena. As we will see, this public version is importantly different
from the understanding of an embryo we get from putting it under
the microscope and watching it carefully as it unfolds and changes
during a series of developmental stages.
For most of history, some people cared about embryos but they
were not of central importance politically or culturally. Pregnancy,
reproduction, and babies were important, but the process leading
to them remained largely in the background. That changed for a
number of reasons in the later twentieth century. Human embry-
onic stem cell research, ﬁrst publicly announced in 1998, caused
some of the most widely discussed and complicated debates about
embryos, with newspaper and television images widely distrib-
uted. The public experienced heated debate about stem cells,
cloning, and embryos as a result of scientiﬁc innovation, and em-
bryos became a more public object than they had been. The sci-
entiﬁc ability to work with human embryonic stem cells raised new
questions about how we understand embryos and their social as
well as scientiﬁc importance.
The resulting discussions depended on a simpliﬁed and often
distorted public imagination of what an embryo is, despite efforts
by serious news media and scholars to explain the biological in-
tricacies. To many, it seemed a question of whether to take human
embryos at the stage just before they become implanted into a
uterus and to kill them in order to harvest the pluripotent stem cells
inside. This meant fertilizing eggs and allowing them to divide
in vitro, in glass dishes. It meant fertilizing a number of eggs and
hoping that some would develop, and it meant being able to watch
them divide from one cell into more and more, up to a couple
hundred cells that make up the late blastocyst stage.
For some, the embryos in their earliest stages are already tiny
persons. They are not quite like the older imagined homunculus
invoked by Nicolas Hartsoeker and others, which was thought to be
an actual tiny man or woman already formed inside a spermato-
zoon or perhaps inside an ovum (See discussion, Maienschein,
2003, pp. 26e29.). Rather, they are continuous with and simply
the earliest stages of an individual human and therefore seem to
have some special status as a sort of little person. To kill them
therefore seems morally wrong to the strongest proponents of this
view. Even to those who are less sure about the moral status,
destroying these tiny embryos by choice makes them feel queasy.A background consideration that has undoubtedly inﬂuenced
the way people envision embryos comes from the international
popularity of Swedish photographer and journalist Lennart Nils-
son’s work. Nilsson’s fascinationwith microscopes and cameras led
him to explore what could be seen with the medical approach,
laparoscopy and then further what he could do using an endoscope
to capture images from inside pregnant women. His ﬁrst images
actually depicted dead fetuses, but were so beautifully composed
that they seemed to present the very essence of life. In 1965 he
published A Child is Born and in the same year his images graced the
cover of the widely read Life magazine. Nilsson’s images appeared
everywhere, and they shaped or probably more nearly reinforced
the public perception of how humans develop. What were mostly
fully formed later stage fetuses were often referred to in the media
as “embryos,” though Nilsson never sought to deceive about their
nature or their status. These images, whether of dead or live
specimens, seemed to present little people resting peacefully and
waiting to be born. His documentaries such as The Miracle of Life in
1983 reinforced the impression (Nilsson, 1967, 1983).
Yet as public discussion about stem cell research has made clear,
the fact is that ever since we have been able to carry out in vitro
fertilization for fertility treatments, we have been destroying tiny
embryos. (See the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
website for more information about IVF clinics and policies.) Lots
of them. On purpose. Andwithout worrying about themverymuch.
In fertility clinics, people provide eggs or sperm, sperm fertilize
eggs, and embryos result. There are too many embryos to be
implanted into a prospective mother. Some are frozen, others dis-
carded. Many would never continue to develop further anyway, for
a variety of biological and medical reasons. Again, this is routine
standard of care for embryos, as it were. The difference with em-
bryonic stem cell research is simply that the embryos are actually
used, in this case to harvest pluripotent cells and to culture them for
possible research or therapeutic use.
Why did stem cell research ignite such a ﬁrestorm of contro-
versy, then? If the fertility business had been generating and
destroying embryos for decades, why would stem cell research be
any different? Did the goal of actually putting the cells to use, as
well as fulﬁlling the hopes for treating infertility in thosewho could
afford to pay for the rather expensive process justify the means of
embryo destruction? For some, yes. For others, no. In part this was
because a mix of opinions already existed, but the fertility business
had remained largely unregulated, undiscussed, and completely
unfamiliar to most Americans in particular. Embryonic stem cell
research brought the destruction of embryos into the public sphere
and in fact made the embryo public in a way it had not been before.
With the embryo out in the open, in effect, advocates of various
political positions could imagine the embryo in various ways and
assign their preferred meanings to it. Anti-abortionists invoked an
image of the embryo as if it were the equivalent of a late stage fetus
or even of an infant, as we have seen (andwebsites at the time even
featured many such fetuses labeled as embryos, with the sugges-
tion that stem cell research would involve killing such humans).
Those opposed to fertility research and treatments could incant,
only more loudly than before perhaps, that embryos are persons
and deserve protection. Those in favor of abortion rights and/or
embryo research continued to maintain that the early embryonic
stages are in fact not yet persons and do not deserve to be treated or
imagined as such.
All such debates have taken place in the context of reproduction
politics and preferences (For example, see Franklin, 2007 and
Thompson, 2007, 2014.). We see a wide diversity of competing
opinions about several different overlapping and intersecting is-
sues, which leads to lively discussion but considerable lack of
clarity at times. Many feminists have worried about the abuse of
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have worried that attacks on stem cell research would lead to
restrictive responses limiting women’s rights and access to fertility
treatments. Some who saw embryos as having “special” status, as
President George W. Bush put it, for example, worried that re-
searchers should not do any and all kinds of research they might
want to with embryos, but that the argument for using those that
had already been destroyed could be morally justiﬁed.
This latter position is the one Bush adopted in his address on
August 7, 2001. He spoke from his ranch in Texas and announced
that he was fulﬁlling his promise to provide executive guidance on
stem cell research. In a nuanced position, which he reported was
guided by the National Institutes of Health Stem Cell Primer (later
renamed as the Stem Cell Basics), Bush presented his executive
order that allowed federal funding for research on those cell lines
that already existed at the very moment he began his speech (NIH,
2001). In other words, if the embryos had already been destroyed in
order to produce the cell lines, then more was to be gained by
allowing research on them. But destruction of any additional em-
bryos was prohibited. Bush argued that he had been persuaded that
approach would protect all future embryos while also allowing
research to go forward. He believed that the existing cell lines
would provide sufﬁcient research material to proceed with at-
tempts to develop cures (Bush, 2006).
Critics attacked immediately. While some had wanted him to
ban all federal funding for all research, including on existing cell
lines, others had wanted him to allow further research. Almost
everybody found something to complain about. But not for long,
since a month later on September 11, 2001 terrorists attacked the
World Trade Center and The Pentagon, and attention swiveled
away from embryos. Of course, debate did continue, but the force of
public opinion was blunted for some time. It peaked again when
California’s Proposition 71 explicitly provided funding for stem cell
research, including on human embryonic cells, and with news of a
series of apparent scientiﬁc breakthroughs, proposed clinical trials,
and various other news reports.
Many people have said many things about the California stem
cell initiative but Charis Thompson’s Good Science: The Ethical
Choreography of Stem Cell Research nonetheless sheds new light on
the subject. She argues that in order to get to “good science” we
need a “choreography” of science and ethics. The biopolitics of stem
cell research has made it particularly difﬁcult to sort out the range
of issues and opinions on all sides; all the more reason then for an
effective choreography of the dance. Now that stem cell research
has matured, or in her sense reached the “end of the beginning” of
the stem cell enterprise, it is time to pay closer attention to what
should count as good science. Such science must involve doing
good ethically, and also doing well socio-economically while doing
science effectively. Her essays that make up the chapters of her
book walk through issues of politics, policy, ethics from multiple
perspectives, and the constraints of social and economic reality.
“Good science cannot be achieved or legislated once and for all,”
she notes. “It is ongoing and iterative, and it requires openness to
dissent and the best work of many different kinds of contributors”
(Thompson, 2014, p. 225).
Sarah Franklin provides another perspective with her Biological
Relatives: IVF, Stem Cells, and the Future of Kinship. Franklin discusses
ways in which the biological and social intermix. With its focus on
the United Kingdom, Franklin’s study is an excellent complement to
Thompson’s focus on California and my own on the United States.
The U.K. has beenmuchmore publicly reﬂective about reproductive
technologies such as in vitro fertilization and all its complex per-
mutations, as well as about embryo research more generally
(Franklin, 2013).The point here is not to repeat all the discussions of stem cell
and related embryo research. The two books just mentioned do a
ﬁne job of covering a wide range of important topics in very recent
terms. My main goal is to suggest that it was stem cell research
carried out in the context of reproduction that made embryos more
public, more visible in an imagined sense, and more contested.
Stem cell research brought questions about embryos to the legis-
lative, judicial, and executive branches of government in the United
States and elsewhere. The research and its possibilities, and the
apparent necessary killing of embryos elicited thoughtful responses
from the National Institutes of Health and the National Research
Council in the United States and from other bodies in other coun-
tries (NIH, 2011; NRC, 2001, 2002). Stem cell research did this in a
way that in vitro fertilization had not quite done. The result has
been a very strongly imagined embryo with public resonance. And
that is very different from the biological embryo in a number of
important ways. I am not claiming that the two are in conﬂict, or
that they could not be compatible, but rather that the arguments
have been divergent and the voices discordant.
2. Biological embryos
In contrast with public embryos, biological embryos are un-
derstood to start with one material cell that has some structure but
very little gene expression, that then divides into two cells, then
four, then eight, and then more and more. At this point, the embryo
is just a bunch of cells that are beginning to divide and differentiate,
and eventually develop into something with the structure and
function of a complex organism. The embryo changes gradually
over time, and eventually what started as one cell may be suc-
cessful in becoming a fully formed adult of the right sort. Biological
embryos go through developmental stages that differ from one
another and that demonstrate progressive differentiation and
growth.
The primary difference between this biological embryo and the
publicly imagined one is that this is “just” biological material
without structure and with very little function until later stages.
There is very little differentiation at the early stages, and in humans
the ﬁrst eight cells each remain totipotent. That is, each of them has
the capacity to become a whole organism. At this point, they are all
alike. This is what makes it possible to have identical twins, for
example, or quadruplets or even more, because the cells divide and
then separate rather than stay together in one whole organism.
Cells retain this capacity and remain totipotent up until the eight-
cell stage. At that point, they begin to divide at different rates,
and to differentiate into a cluster of cells surrounded by a layer of
cells that becomes the placenta. The cluster of cells in the middle is
called the inner cell mass, and they lose their capacity to become
the entire organism and become instead pluripotent. That is, each
individual cell can become any kind of cell, but no one cell can
become all kinds.
In short, this biological embryo in its earliest stage is a bunch of
cells. It is not organized yet, it is not expressing genes that cause
differentiation, and up until what is called the blastocyst stage, it
does not even grow larger. It is just a bunch of material cells that
interact and interconnect. Its “meaning” is quite different from the
newly conceived public embryo with its imagined emerging
personhood that has evoked calls for protection.
In each case, we know that the very beginning changes lead
through time to the fully formed infant that may result. But in one
case, the public imagines the infant as “in” the egg in some way,
even though not literally. In contrast, the biological understanding
acknowledges that most fertilized eggs never become infants at all
for a large number of reasons and that the characteristics that make
up the individual emerge only very gradually, over time and with
Fig. 1. Karl Ernst von Baer’s segmenting development of frog eggs. From von Baer, “Die Metamophose des Eies der Batrachier vor der Erscheinung des Embryo,” Archiv für Anatomie,
Physiologie und Wissenschaftliche Medizin (1834: pp. 481e509). Plate labeled as Table XI and bound at the back of the volume. Courtesy of the Marine Biological Laboratory Library.
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For more detail on the intricate processes of embryo development
in humans, see especially the marvelous Life Unfolding: How the
Human Body Creates Itself by anatomist Jamie Davies. He shows step
by step the astonishingly well-choreographed biological processes
that allow the cells to self-organize into an embryo and eventually
into a person (Davies, 2014).
Thus, we have two different and divergent ideas of embryos.
Most importantly, history shows us that both have existed for a very
long time. It is only recently that the two have begun to collide
more often and more vigorously as the biological embryo has
become more public, and as advocates have attempted to move the
public embryo into discussions of policy in ways for which it
matters whether they have the story “right.” That is, only recently
have the biological and public embryos begun to occupy the same
political spheres. It is worth reﬂecting on the historical episodes
that have brought us to this point.
3. Historical emergence of understanding embryos
Throughout history and continuing today, the public embryo
has focused on imagining the continuities from one stage ofdevelopment to the next and so on. Yet early Jewish and Catholic
interpretations, and Muslim interpretations that followed, placed
the beginning of an individual life as beginning at a point of
discontinuity. That was the moment of quickening, ensoulment, or
hominization as it was variously called; scholars as well as the
public imagined that ﬂuids from the mother and father came
together in some way and combined, such that at “forty days” the
ﬂuids became an individual. Different interpreters assigned full
“personhood” with legal consequences at different stages of
development thereafter, in some cultures not until well after birth.
Aristotle held a similar view, though it was not some religious
ensoulment but rather action of his ﬁnal cause that led the com-
bined ﬂuids to emerge gradually and epigenetically as an individual
organism (See discussion in Maienschein, 2014, chap. 2.).
By the early nineteenth century, Karl Ernst von Baer had been
busily working to understand chick development, to ﬁnd a
mammalian egg, and to trace the stages of frog development. His
illustrations in a paper from 1834 showed clearly howgradually the
form emerged from the fertilized egg and how very unformed the
earliest stages remained. There he offered an illustration of a frog
embryo, showing that it started as an egg cell that divided and kept
dividing until it began to take on some form. He watched the
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rather thanwhat theory might suggest (Von Baer, 1834) (see Fig. 1).
Despite such accumulating biological evidence that fertilization
is just the very ﬁrst stage in a complex process of development, the
Catholic church declared formally that the individual’s “life” and its
individuality start at “conception” rather than at any later point. In
1869 Pope Pius IX declared this to be so, during the period called
Vatican 1 or the First Vatican Council, which involved a conserva-
tive reform. His declaration provided a basis for insisting that
abortion, contraception, and other interferences with the biological
process are morally illicit for Catholics (Maienschein, 2003, pp. 42e
43). This was a change from previous views, and much has been
written about this elsewhere.
The point here is that for millennia the public understanding of
embryos had placed an imagined beginning for each individual
organism at the time of ensoulment, or forty days. By the middle of
the nineteenth century, however, while biologists were observing
many details about the series of developmental stages that brought
very gradual emergence of form, for Catholics life suddenly was
seen as starting at conception. These two public ideas of an embryo
have persisted, but for at least the last quarter of the twentieth
century the life-begins-at-conception image has gained consider-
able public dominance. This image has been reinforced by a variety
of religious and philosophical advocates.
In fact, this public embryo does not contradict biological un-
derstandingd to a point. Of course there is a beginning point with
fertilization. The difference between the publicly imagined and
biologically studied embryos is in the meaning assigned to fertil-
ization and to the earliest developmental stages. For the publicly
imagined embryo, the beginning is the same as later stages in
important ways; for biologists, each stage is very different.
It is worth looking brieﬂy at the accumulating knowledge bi-
ologists have been adding to the biological understanding of em-
bryos, an increasingly different understanding but one that has
until recently co-existed with the imagined embryo. By the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, observers had begun to peer
through microscopes and to see blobs of unformed cells. By the
mid-nineteenth century other observers watched sperm cells
fertilize egg cells and begin cell division. They saw this in a number
of different species, though not humans. By the early twentieth
century, biologists understood a great deal about the development
of many organisms, especially invertebrates such as sea urchins, as
well as frogs and chicks. Only gradually during the twentieth cen-
tury did they gain more directly observed knowledge about
mammals, however, since mammalian eggs are inside females and
therefore not visible (For more detail, see Maienschein, 2014a,
chaps. 2 and 3.).
In 1978, in vitro fertilization brought the egg, the fertilization
process, and therefore the early embryo out into the open. This is
the ﬁrst time the publicly imagined and envisioned embryo began
to collide directly with the biologically observed embryo. The im-
age of the embryo in the dish and the resulting “test tube baby”
excited the public imagination in new ways about what was
possible with human reproduction. Yet the publicly imagined em-
bryo remained that of the beginnings of a person there in the
dish (For more discussion, see Maienschein, 2014a, chap. 5.).
And, yes again, there are cells in the in vitro culture dish. And,
yes again, those cells are continuous with the resulting individual.
But that’s only in those few cases that actually result in fertilization
and all the complex additional steps it takes to make an infant.
In vitro fertilization starts with eggs, which have to be procured
from women at some considerable cost to those women (For
example, see Thompson, 2014 and Franklin, 2007.). Then sperm,
which is acquired frommen as designated donors or through sperm
banks, is added. In a minority of cases, a sperm cell fertilizes an eggcell and forms a zygote. At this point, the chromosomes go through
a complex dance to make sure that the resulting “conceptus” ends
up with the right number of the right type of chromosomes. This
pre-implantation embryo can exist in the dish up until the blas-
tocyst stage, when there are an estimated 200e300 cells. At this
point, the blastocyst has to be transplanted into a uterus in order to
survive and continue development.
We can watch this process take place up to the point of im-
plantation. Quite a number of fertilization videos showing what
happens appear on YouTube and on education websites. Clearly,
this is a bunch of cells. If the camera shows the action, generally it is
clear that most eggs never become fertilized. And most of those
that are fertilized never progress to the late blastocyst stage, and of
those most are never implanted. Fertility clinics have improved
their success rates in the past by implanting more than one embryo
and hoping that only one will continue to develop. More recently,
many clinics have focused technologies on obtaining the very
healthiest embryo and then transplanting just one into the uterus
to increase the odds of a healthy pregnancy. (See, for example,
American Society for Reproductive Medicine for protocols and
procedures.)
These early embryos are visible in the clinic dish. A few of them
will go on to become implanted embryos, and a few of those will
continue to become successful healthy infants. Most will not. This is
part of the biological understanding of embryos. Again, the earliest
stages are just a bunch of cells. They are material, they follow
processes of cell division, and they change over time. But they are
not yet formed, nor do they have very complex functioning ormuch
gene expression yet. Most just die. Any romantic notion of each
fertilized egg as an individual person that deserves legal pro-
tections or has a very special status simply does not match well
with the reality that most die. The biological embryo and the
imagined public embryo are at odds in the sense of the meanings
assigned to each. For the ﬁrst few decades of IVF, the fertility
business had very strong incentives to do their work quietly and not
make the embryo very public. In recent decades, the public and
biological ideas have had reason to collide in ways that are only
likely to increase in number.4. New science, new public understanding, and new collisions
of meanings
For practical reasons, in vitro fertilization had reached a truce
with public imaginations about what those embryos in a dishmight
be. Many people with fertility problems wanted help, and the
momentum lay in developing better technologies rather than in
restricting applications. Cloning and stem cell research changed the
political landscape for embryos.
Cloning involves transplanting a nucleus from one cell to
another cell from which the nucleus has been removed. For
reproductive cloning, the host cell is an egg, and the resulting
embryo would be considered a clone of the donor from which the
nucleus came. For so-called therapeutic cloning, the developmental
process would stop at the blastocyst stage and the pluripotent stem
cells would be harvested rather than implanting that blastocyst
into a uterus. The reason for carrying out such a process would be to
produce stem cells that are genetically like the donor.
Stem cell research attracted such lively public attention, I’m sure
we all recall, because the process of obtaining the pluripotent stem
cells requires harvesting them from an embryo. And the “harvest-
ing” effectively kills the embryo. The technology of human em-
bryonic stem cell research ﬁrst published in 1998 therefore made
clear that embryos could be put to usedinitially for research pur-
poses and then in newly imagined ways through stem cell
Fig. 3. Beatrice Mintz and her chimeric mice. (Photo available through the Smithso-
nian Institution, Acc. 90e105dScience Service Records, 1920se1970s, Smithsonian
Institution Archives, http://www.ﬂickr.com/photos/smithsonian/6891505741/.)
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we need not cover that ground again here.
But imagination about what might be possible created a modi-
ﬁed meaning for the public embryo. For many, the discussion
reinforced existing impressions of the embryo as a special kind of
thing that is almost, or potentially, or perhaps even already a per-
son. Others imagined the uses for pluripotent stem cells and saw a
higher good. Still others looked more closely at the biological em-
bryo and realized that cells in a dish during early stages of em-
bryonic development are just cells. Public imaginations about
embryos did not change signiﬁcantly, but they became more vivid,
more immediate, and more real as this discussion came directly
into the political arena. Much has been written about the legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive branch actions and reactions, so we
need not repeat those discussions here. Fewer scholars have looked
carefully at state decisions, however, so that remains an open area.
(The National Council of State Legislatures website provides a
useful guide to U.S. legislation, for example.)
5. Embryos that aren’t what they are supposed to be
For many centuries, people have been fascinated by what were
called “Siamese twins,” named for the reported origin of early cases
and consisting of two bodies conjoined in some way. Some are
joined superﬁcially at a hip or the chest, and otherwise consist of
complete bodies. Others are joined more deeply and share organs
or even heads. The more complicated the connections, the less
likely the combination is to live long. Today, in developed countries
surgery can address many cases and the most common standard of
care calls for separating the two or sometimes having to kill one to
save the other (see Fig. 2).
In other cases, two embryos come together and develop
abnormally. In some cases, one twin dies and is absorbed by the
other. Yet in other cases, the second twin is not absorbed; rather
one continues to develop apparently normally, but with a devel-
oping parasitic twin inside. Examples include an individual with
the back of another individual growing out of it, or with part of a
body curled up inside the living individual. All manner of possi-
bilities seem to occur. Again, today in developed countries, surgery
can correct what is seen as a medical problem, but cases still doFig. 2. Frank Rattray Lillie’s freemartin, with one male and one female twin joined, as part o
This is the original drawing, hanging in the Marine Biological Laboratory Archives and donarise if there is no early medical intervention. They show that the
individual organism has the capacity to absorb, combine with, or
otherwise change another organism. This fact, in turn, calls into
question simplistic assumptions about what counts as an individ-
ual. (See Maienschein, 2014b, for discussion and for considerable
public response.)
Still a different kind of pathology that may seem similar but
actually is not concerns teratomas. The cases just described consist
of two separate, and at some point independent, fertilized eggs that
come together. In the case of teratomas the embryo is single, yetf Lillie’s demonstration of the ways that the male dominates the female’s development.
ated by Lillie.
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develop at the time they normally would. They remain pluripotent
and keep dividing. Then at some point, they begin to differentiate
into tissues that would not normally exist in the location and time
they appear. For example, inwork that led him to identify and name
pluripotent stem cells, Leroy Stevens reported the appearance of
teratomas in a certain strain of mice and discovered that hair, teeth,
and other tissues formed inside the testicles. He later showed that
he could graft cells from that cell line to another mouse and pro-
duce teratomas after transplantation (Lewis, 2000; Stevens, 1970).
Small teratomas probably go unnoticed quite often, so it is not clear
just how common such developments are.
These are all examples of how individual embryos are not quite
as neatly deﬁned as the public perception would suggest. Other
examples show even more dramatically just how complex embry-
onic development is. Chimeras occur when cells of two different
germ lines join together in one individual. We know now that this
happens frequently in mothers, who absorb some cells from their
offspring. Other more routine examples occur when medical pro-
cedures involve transplanting cells from one organism to anoth-
erdwhether as tissue, organs, or blood. The result is technically a
chimera. Those examples do not raise the kinds of questions that
embryo chimeras do, however. As Beatrice Mintz and Nicole Le
Douarin showed in the 1960s and 1980s respectively, it is possible
that two embryos from different species can actually merge
completely and develop into apparently perfectly healthy organ-
isms. Mintz showed this by combining embryos from two different
strains of mice, and Le Douarin showed it with chick and quail and
embryos of other species (Le Douarin and McClaren, 1984; Mintz,
1962) (see Fig. 3).
But what is an embryo if it is possible to take cells from different
organisms and even different species and combine them to
construct a new kind of result? What is a human embryo if re-
searchers could take a human embryo and that of another species
and combine them to grow into a new kind of organism? Nobody
has done such an experiment, or not successfully and not to our
knowledge, nor is it likely to succeed easily. But the very possibility
raises deep questions about what an embryo actually is along with
the obvious ethical questions. Such chimeras or combined twins do
not ﬁt the public perception of embryos. Biologically, these phe-
nomena are not obvious, but they ﬁt with our historically growing
understanding of embryos and how they develop.
Embryos with three parents (in the sense of three contributors
to the genome of the offspring) raise different kinds of questions for
the public perception. Most recently, researchers have learned how
to add mitochondria from a donor to an egg that lacks healthy
mitochondria of its own. Because the mitochondria bring different
genetic material, this procedure produces a new kind of chimera
and raises new ethical questions about the safety as well as the
identity of the offspring. The fact that the procedure is possible and
can be done effectively shows in still other ways how our public
understanding of embryos is lacking.
Synthetic biology stretches the imagination still further. As Craig
Venter and his team showed, it is possible to use a scaffold to syn-
thesize parts of a cell. Venter wants to go all theway and synthesize
a cell from “scratch.” Venter and extremely creative researchers and
engineers like himwould surely love to synthesize an embryo if they
could. How exciting it would be to engineer life at that level and in
that way! And how horrifying that prospect would be for many.
New technologies and synthetic biology seem to raise new ques-
tions and redraw the battle lines in ways that discovery of new
knowledge has not yet done (Forum on Synthetic Biology, 2014).
The publicly imagined embryo is very limited, and while some
are excited by all this innovation, many ﬁnd it frightening to envi-
sion something quite different than their cherished assumptionshave led them to believe. Accumulating knowledge about conjoined
or parasitic twins, teratomas, chimeras, and other scientiﬁc dis-
coveries that show just how complex the biological embryo really is
has elicited some interest but has not yet commanded signiﬁcant
public attention or a new social understanding of embryos. The
mantra that life begins at conception, or fertilization, gives a tidy
understanding in which it is relatively easy to assign meaning and
value to the various developmental stages. As a diverse public, we
may argue about whether the earliest embryonic stages deserve the
same legal protections or have the same rights as later stages. We
may have different feelings and convictions about the precise
moment when an embryo becomes a person. But we know that
many people believe that moment is at conception. The battle lines
about values seem relatively clear, and the debates about abortion
have persisted in the public arena for a very long time.
6. Why bridging the gap is so hard, and why it matters when
situating science in society
In fact, embryos are very much more interesting, creative, and
resilient than the standard public impression would suggest. The
capacity to regulate the whole in response to changing environ-
mental conditions shows that embryos can be very robust and are
much more complex than the simple idea that life begins at
conception and just grows up. The biological realities of embryos
show how limited the public imagination has been.
So, as biological knowledge accumulates, and our biological
understanding of the embryo diverges yet further from the publicly
imagined embryo, why does the public embryo not change? Why
do the two not converge so that the public imagination embraces
the complexities of biological reality?
The easy answer is politics. Just as we, perhaps especially in the
United States, seem to diverge further on many social issues rather
than reaching a middle ground of understanding, people seem
committed to their long and deeply held views. There is little
incentive to change one’s treasured convictions in part because we
have accepted a disconnection between science and society. The
popular science writer and paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould
maintained that science and social views and values exist in two
non-overlapping magisteria (Gould, 1999). He was referring to is-
sues about evolution in particular, but the same reasoning holds
when thinking about embryos and abortion. Gould and many
others hold that it is possible to have cherished beliefs that conﬂict
in some ways with scientiﬁc ideas, and that’s ok.
I disagree. In some cases where scientiﬁc and social views
conﬂict, it is possible to hold on to aspects of both. But in other
cases, the conﬂicts become too important to ignore or gloss over.
When it is time to make social policy, it is not reasonable to reject
the scientiﬁc knowledge and pretend that it does not exist. It is not
reasonable to develop social policy that is in direct conﬂict with
biological knowledge. Though science should not by itself deter-
mine social values and policies, those policies should at the very
least not be inconsistent with the science.
Considerable discussion of the public will to reject science, or in
some cases willfully deny scientiﬁc claims has led to widely dis-
cussed work about climate change, smoking, and we can add em-
bryo research. Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger have invoked
the name “agnatology” for the cultural production of ignorance. In a
conference convened by the British Society for the History of Sci-
ence, they led discussion of how public ignorance is produced and
reinforced (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008). Proctor’s ownwork has
focused on smoking. Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway have looked
at the relations of smoking and climate change, showing an
intentional campaign to create doubt about well-established sci-
entiﬁc knowledge (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Evolution provides
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thors, I want to reject the legitimacy of such an approach and de-
mand that at the minimum, public policy in our secular society
should not be inconsistent with established scientiﬁc knowledge.
This means that any public that might decide that embryos
should be treated as persons with full legal rights, as the person-
hoodmovement suggests, has to understand thatmost embryos die
naturally and many more die in the process of fertility treatments.
Any public that might decide to deﬁne an embryo as an individual
will have to recognize that it could, in fact, divide into two in-
dividuals or could absorb another. Any public seeking to protect the
germ line of individuals would have to understand that germ lines
are modiﬁed by a variety of chimeric activities.
7. Conclusions
Using the instruments of biological sciences to probe embryonic
media provides an intriguing case study of science in society. This is
a case of diverging meanings of embryos, and also of life. It is a case
of conﬂicting values underlying the preference for a publicly
imagined embryo or a biologically observed embryo. We cannot
dictate what policy will or even should emerge from such conﬂicts.
But we can seek to inform the process by bringing the biological
understanding, accessible with microscopes and careful observa-
tion and experimentation, to the public discussions as well as
acknowledging the depth and persistence of the social commit-
ment to the public embryo.
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